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Belief revision is the key change mechanism underlying the psychological intervention
known as cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). It both motivates and reinforces new
behavior. In this review we analyze and apply a novel approach to this process based
on AGM theory of belief revision, named after its proponents, Carlos Alchourrón, Peter
Gärdenfors and David Makinson. AGM is a set-theoretical model. We reconceptualize it
as describing a non-linear, dynamical system that occurs within a semantic space, which
can be represented as a phase plane comprising all of the brain’s attentional, cognitive,
affective and physiological resources. Triggering events, such as anxiety-producing or
depressing situations in the real world, or their imaginal equivalents, mobilize these assets
so they converge on an equilibrium point. A preference function then evaluates and
integrates evidentiary data associated with individual beliefs, selecting some of them
and comprising them into a belief set, which is a metastable state. Belief sets evolve
in time from one metastable state to another. In the phase space, this evolution creates a
heteroclinic channel. AGM regulates this process and characterizes the outcome at each
equilibrium point. Its objective is to define the necessary and sufficient conditions for belief
revision by simultaneously minimizing the set of new beliefs that have to be adopted,
and the set of old beliefs that have to be discarded or reformulated. Using AGM, belief
revision can be modeled using three (and only three) fundamental syntactical operations
performed on belief sets, which are expansion; revision; and contraction. Expansion is like
adding a new belief without changing any old ones. Revision is like adding a new belief and
changing old, inconsistent ones. Contraction is like changing an old belief without adding
any new ones. We provide operationalized examples of this process in action.
Keywords: AGM theory, belief revision, cognitive behavioral therapy, cognitive restructuring, exposure/response
prevention, non-linear dynamical psychiatry, systematic desensitization
Non-linear dynamical psychiatry recently has taken two different
directions. The first is the granular description of neurological
systems from a bottom-up, micro level, in order to characterize
a cognitive phenotype such as emotion or attention (illustrative is
Rabinovich et al., 2010a). The second is the functional description
of psychopathology and corollary intervention strategies from a
top-down, macro level, in order to characterize the course and
progression of psychiatric disorders (illustrative is Bystritsky et al.,
2012). Drawing on both, in this review we set forth a theory of
belief revision for the intervention strategy known as cognitive
behavioral therapy (CBT). CBT postulates that psychiatric dis-
orders such as anxiety and depression are not caused by acts,
transactions, events or circumstances in the real world, or by one’s
imaginal reconstruction of them. Rather, they result from one’s
attitude, orientation or outlook toward them. Persons who are
anxious or depressed hold dysfunctional beliefs about themselves,
others, their environment and the future. Dysfunctional beliefs
are caused by an invalidating environment, deficient information-
gathering practices and breakdowns in one’s belief formation
system (Warman et al., 2007). They often are accompanied by
dysregulated emotions (Linehan, 1993). As a result, persons hold-
ing them engage in problematic or undesired behavior that is
personally distressful or socially maladaptive, for example, anger,
impulsivity, self-harm, self-isolation or substance abuse (“target
behavior”).
Belief revision is the primary therapeutic technology underly-
ing CBT. As we will explain, it comes in two types. The first, called
“cognitive restructuring,” reformulates old beliefs and changes
them into new ones. As a result, one is able to reregulate one’s
emotions and modify or abandon target behavior. The second
results from behavioral change through a process called “sys-
tematic desensitization” or “exposure/response prevention.” It
extinguishes old, conditioned target behavior and introduces new
more flexible, adaptive behavior. This in turn reformulates or dis-
cards old beliefs and reregulates emotions, reinforcing the newly-
learned behavior. In both cases, the new behavior then stabilizes,
consolidates and strengthens the new beliefs. Both are forms of
belief revision: the former, more cognitively-based than behav-
ioral; and the latter, more behaviorally-based than cognitive.
Belief revision also reduces the intensity of interoceptive alarms
activated by the sympathetic nervous system when stressed, such
as those characteristic of panic (Khalsa et al., 2009; Domschke
et al., 2010). CBT widely is regarded as the paradigm of an
empirically-supported therapy (EST) (Butler et al., 2006), which
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should make it particularly amenable to a cognitive science-based
approach.
Our central premise is that belief revision in CBT is an integral
component of a non-linear dynamical process of psychological
change as conceptualized, for example, by Bystritsky et al. (2013).
Anxiety and mood disorders have three essential components,
which are alarms, beliefs and coping strategies (A-B-C). Alarms
can be evaluated using conventional metrics such as their fre-
quency, intensity, duration and onset. Coping strategies–a form
of behavior–can be evaluated by whether they are distressful, mal-
adaptive, or effective in down-regulating the incidence of target
behavior and the intensity of correlative alarms. Beliefs are more
difficult to integrate into a theory of non-linear dynamical sys-
tems. They have several unique characteristics as cognitive phe-
notypes, which prevent them from fitting well into the canonical
model. One might not even notice one has beliefs to begin with,
unless and until they are activated by environmental triggers,
interoceptive sensations or undesired behavioral consequences.
Alternatively, we propose and demonstrate a set-theoretical,
semantically-based approach to belief revision known as AGM
theory, and show how it is the most plausible candidate to per-
form belief revision within a non-linear, dynamical framework.
AGM is an acronym of the last names of its inventors, Alchourrón
et al. (1985). It sets forth the requirements for non-delusional
belief change in light of new evidence, and that one’s resulting
updated knowledge base must meet, in order to remain intuitively
appealing (Carnota and Rodríguez, 2011, p. 2). As we discuss
at §3, AGM operationalizes the cognitive component of CBT.
Its objective is to define the necessary and sufficient conditions
for belief revision by simultaneously minimizing the set of new
beliefs that have to be adopted, and the set of old beliefs that
have to be discarded or reformulated. Using AGM, belief revi-
sion can be modeled using three (and only three) fundamental
syntactical operations performed on belief sets, which are expan-
sion; revision; and contraction. Expansion is like adding a new
belief without changing any old ones. Revision is like adding a
new belief and changing old, inconsistent ones. Contraction is like
changing an old belief without adding any new ones.
SOME RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT BELIEF
The nature of belief and what it is to believe in something (a
doxastic state) both long have been central pre-occupations of
psychology and epistemology (Schwitzgebel, 2010). It is beyond
the scope of this review to discuss exhaustively the volumi-
nous literature on belief, which has accumulated relentlessly since
antiquity. We will, however, briefly develop several characteristics
of belief pertinent to its integration into a theory of non-linear
dynamical systems, which any theory of belief revision must take
into account1.
1Some of the other issues affecting beliefs that are beyond the scope of this
review include (for starters): the subjective, phenomenological experience of
belief; taxonomies of different types of beliefs; the relationship between beliefs
and emotions; the role of memory; subjective probability theory; Bayesian
epistemology; Dempster-Shafer theory; theories of reasoning; and rationality.
In addition we do not here address objections such as logical omniscience,
monotonicity and whether language (and beliefs) can be analyzed using a
logical structure, to begin with.
A consensus definition is that beliefs are “states of mind that
have the property of being about things–things in the world,
as well as abstract things, events in the past and things only
imagined” (Churchland and Churchland, 2013, p. 1). Russell
(1921/2005) and colleagues famously developed a theory of
propositions and propositional attitudes. What beliefs are about
is their substantive propositional content, i.e., (that “x”). Belief is
an attitude, orientation or outlook toward that propositional con-
tent, i.e., BEL(“x”). The set of all of one’s beliefs at time t1 is one’s
knowledge base k1. Beliefs are different than simple reference to
people, places or things; informal or colloquial uses (Grice, 1975);
as well as other modes of discourse such as performatives (Austin,
1962)2. While all of its individual elements are controversial in
various respects, for our purposes, Figure 1 depicts the standard
model of belief, with components including perceptual, cognitive,
emotional, linguistic and behavioral processing.
BELIEFS ARE BASED ON EVIDENCE
Evidence is a set of epistemological claims adduced to support
a belief set. Relevant evidence enables one to devise and then
test various hypotheses the belief set generates (Glymour, 1975;
Hartmann and Sprenger, 2010). One is justified in believing that
“x” to the extent one has good evidence for “x” (Feldman and
Conee, 1985; Joyce, 2011). In the case of psychiatric disorders
such as anxiety or depression, evidentiary data are things one
might cite or rely on to support a contention that what one is
afraid will occur, actually will occur. The feared outcome or con-
sequence does not actually have to occur, rather, the evidence
gives credence to the belief or prediction that it will.
From a clinical standpoint, the client is not responding to an
object of fear; instead, to an internal symbolic representation of
it, which (among other properties) has a compelling sense of
reality. The client’s behavioral expressions and coping strategies
in turn are not a reaction to the feared object, but rather to
the set of beliefs surrounding it, comprising the client’s vision
of what the feared object is, or might be. Under these circum-
stances, evidence is nothing more than the way things seem. One
is “right to believe everything he believes as strongly as he believes
it until it is rendered improbable by something else he believes”
(Swinburne, 2011, p. 202). This support function often is con-
ditional (Joyce, 2003). A conditional belief is one with the form
2In linguistics the study of how language actually is used is known as deixis
(Brisard, 2011). Deixis is an example of how one’s environment pragmati-
cally imposes itself on one’s beliefs. Although a word’s semantic meaning may
be fixed, what it actually means can vary with a number of factors, such as
person, place and time. All of these are susceptible to ambiguous reference
if viewed in isolation. It may not be clear, for example, who is designated by
a pronoun. Spatial locutions such as “here” or “there” may designate more
than one location, and temporal ones such as “now” and “then” might apply
to different times (Corazza, 2011; Hanks, 2011). By constraining the limits
of potential communication systems, ambiguity in natural languages actually
may be adaptive (Piantadosi et al., 2012; Solé and Seoane, 2014). Deictic ref-
erence is a sub-category of indexical reference, which expands these principles
to any context-sensitive use. Example: a vague expression with a hidden or
latent variable, or one that has a particular meaning unique to a local commu-
nity (such as “urban slang”), which often is uninterpretable absent specialized
knowledge (Braun, 2007).
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FIGURE 1 | Depiction of canonical belief model. Photograph licensed from Getty Images
BEL(x)|{EVID1, EVID2,. . . EVIDn}, which reads “BEL(that “x”)
assuming {EVID1, EVID2,. . . EVIDn}” (Arlo-Costa, 2007).
In psychiatry, evidence often is clinical observations of
patient behavior or patient reports of symptoms set forth
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5) (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). An example of the former:
BEL(“This person is depressed”) | EVID(“She has insomnia
or hypersomnia nearly every day and significant weight loss
when not dieting or weight gain, or decrease or increase in
appetite nearly every day”). An example of the latter: BEL(“I’m
depressed”) | EVID(“I have markedly diminished interest or plea-
sure in all, or almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every
day; and I have feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappro-
priate guilt nearly every day”). Evidence also can be third-person
observations or patient reports of them. Example: EVID(“She
always is fighting with her friends”) or EVID(“My parents always
told me so”). Persons also may have corollary beliefs about
their beliefs (Paulus and Stein, 2010). For example, one might
BEL(“Therapy/pharmacology doesn’t help”) or BEL(“I’m going
to have this for the rest of my life”). They also might be reflex-
ive, as in BEL(“I’m afraid of experiencing the symptoms of panic
disorder”).
REFERENTIAL OPACITY
A sentence’s reference is what it designates. Sentences about
beliefs are referentially “opaque” in that co-designating terms
are not intersubstitutable (Quine, 1953/1980). To use a famous
example, Oedipus married Jocasta; Oedipus believed Jocasta was
his girlfriend; Oedipus didn’t know Jocasta was his mother. This
reads as follows: there was a time (t1) when Oedipus believed
“Jocasta was his girlfriend” (BEL1) given the supply of eviden-
tiary data {EVID1, EVID2,. . . EVIDn} then available to him. Even
though true, Oedipus didn’t believe at t1 “Jocasta was his mother”
(BEL2), i.e., BEL2 /∈ k1. He discovered this only at t2, when (to his
consternation) his knowledge base was k2.
It follows that sentences about beliefs are informative in a way
that “the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180◦” is not. Another
famous example from Gottlob Frege: one believes the morning
star rises in the east; one also believes the evening star sets in the
west; one doesn’t know both are the planet Venus. Even though
both sentences refer to the same thing, their meanings or “senses”
are different (Zalta, 2012). Failures of reference do not require one
to postulate intentional conduct. They may be due to something
as simple as accident or mistake (Austin, 1956/1970)3. The main
3A related concept is intensionality, later developed by Rudolf Carnap
(1947/1988). Intension roughly is the same thing as meaning or sense. It
contrasts with extension, which roughly is the same thing as reference. For
Carnap, two phrases or sentences have the same extension if they designate the
same thing, i.e. they both are true or false with regards to it, so that one can be
substituted for the other. Intensional ones fail this test, at least for our actual
world. There is, however, a possible world or state-description with different
conditions, in which there is substitutability of identity. That possible world
could be our actual world at a different point in time, or even the knowledge
base of different persons. Beliefs, according to Carnap, are neither extensional
or intensional, because one can believe x but not y or z without realizing they
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 55 | 3
Kronemyer and Bystritsky Belief revision in CBT
problem with belief reports is that they rely on a client’s interpre-
tation of her subjective phenomenological experience (Dattilio
et al., 2010).
BELIEFS ARE SUBJECTIVE
Referential opacity is a set-theoretical way of saying that beliefs
are inherently subjective. As homo credens, people are infinitely
capable of believing any number of different things (Shermer,
2012). One might believe in unicorns, global warming, conspir-
acy theories, that the sun revolves around the earth, or that they
are the present King of France. It is not our intention to restrict
the content of different beliefs, or the types of evidence that may
be adduced to support them.
Psychiatrists and psychologists have devised numerous ways
to find out what people believe, including observing them, test-
ing them and asking them. In this sense, beliefs are “epistemically
objective.” Implausible as it may seem, in the near future, it might
even be possible to read a person’s mind using neurotechnologies
such as fMRI (Harris et al., 2008; Poldrack et al., 2011); neuropsy-
chiatric phenomics (Bilder et al., 2009a,b); connectionist-type
principles (Sporns et al., 2005); or interactionist-type principles
(Stumpf et al., 2008)4.
One of the perennial issues in cognitive science is whether
these methods ever will be sufficient to account for belief ’s phe-
nomenological texture. There is something unsatisfying about the
neuromaterialistic/neurodeterministic program of extracting the
substantive propositional content of a belief from neurological
events. The reason why is because beliefs are underdetermined
neurophysiologically; a single neurological state potentially could
give rise to any number of different beliefs (they are “multiply
realizable,” (Levine, 1983, 1999); there is an “explanatory gap”
between the two, Davidson, 1970, 1974). Further, they only can
be held by the person who believes them. In this sense they
are “ontologically subjective,” as features or ascriptive predicates
attributable only to that person (Dehaene, 2014, p. 9; Searle,
1995, pp. 7–9)5 . From a clinical standpoint, there is no such
thing as a standardized set of beliefs. Any approach to psy-
chometric assessment that attempts to construct a taxonomy of
typical beliefs, whether normative or pathological, most likely will
not be successful, because beliefs fundamentally are distinctive,
unique and personal. The clinician and the client must become
all refer to the same thing. Phrases or sentences are “intensionally isomorphic”
if in fact this intersubstitutability relationship nonetheless exists.
4The Human Connectome Project was established in September, 2010 by
the U.S. National Institutes of Health (Vance, 2010). In April, 2013, the U.S.
announced its BRAIN Initiative, a $1 billion connectionist-type project. It
joined a similar C1 billion venture, the Human Brain Project, announced
in January, 2013 by the E.U. (Abbott, 2013; Reardon, 2014). Internet com-
panies such as the Allen Institute for Brain Science (Carey, 2012); Google
(Markoff, 2012); and Vicarious (Albergotti, 2014) have similar objectives.
Because connectionism results in something akin to a static, point-in-time
wiring diagram, it is the opposite of non-linear dynamical psychiatry, see §4.
Connectionism has obvious applications to artificial intelligence (AI), beyond
the scope of this review to investigate further.
5Eliminative materialists such as Churchland et al. necessarily are committed
to a theory that psychological disorders are a result of brain malfunction, for
example, defective or impaired neurochemistry (Matthews, 2013).
co-investigators to identify them and the evidence ostensibly
supporting them.
BELIEFS ARE MEDIATED AND MODERATED
Beliefs are mediated and moderated by any number of differ-
ent factors such as background, upbringing, life experiences,
information processing strategies, temperament, attributional
style, other beliefs, context, culture, motivation, and the presence
of environmental cues and situational primes (Hope et al., 2010).
They may be teleological or subject to confirmation bias. People
deploy a variety of heuristic reasoning strategies to arrive at the
beliefs they hold, including hypothesis formation, generalization
and anomaly resolution. Reasoning has a rational basis rooted
in probabilistic approaches to problem-solving (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Oaksford and
Chater, 2007). These strategies have evolved over time to facilitate
our ability to make decisions in situations with incomplete infor-
mation as to potential outcomes (Kahneman et al., 1982; Shafer
and Tversky, 1985; Kahneman, 2003; Michalewicz and Fogel,
2004). They include everything from educated guesses to intu-
itive judgments and common sense. Induction is an important
aspect of human reasoning (Heit and Rotello, 2010; Johnson-
Laird, 2010), as are techniques to evaluate the evidence in support
of individual beliefs such as Bayesian reasoning and Dempster-
Shafer theory (Curley, 2007; Zhao and Osherson, 2010; Zhao
et al., 2012). There also is a complex relationship between cog-
nition and emotion (§2.1.4, below; Pessoa, 2008, 2014). Beliefs
are thought; emotions are felt. Just as one can have beliefs about
one’s emotions, so does one’s emotional state affects one’s belief-
generating system. As with the subjective nature of beliefs (§1.3,
above), while all of these are controversial in various respects, it
is not our intention to restrict the nature, scope and extent of
potential belief influencers.
CONDITIONS OF SATISFACTION
A proposition has the property that it is true or false in the real
world (McGrath, 2012). Beliefs, on the other hand, have condi-
tions of satisfaction–what happens when things are the way one
believes them to be. BEL(“It’s raining”) is satisfied if in fact it is
raining. Under those circumstances, we say the belief is “true.”
Beliefs have a “mind-to-world” direction of fit, in that the belief
corresponds, to some extent, with reality (Searle, 1983).
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY DISRUPTS THE ENTIRE BELIEF TEMPLATE
One of the best ways to consider belief as a psychological
construct is to examine counterfactual cases (Langdon and
Connaughton, 2013). Persons who are anxious or depressed have
beliefs that are dysfunctional and experienced as negative and
invalidating (Bernstein et al., 2010, 2013). Example: BEL(“If I try
to do this, I’m going to fail”).
The main problem with dysfunctional beliefs is they cannot be
assigned a truth value, as in BEL (“The cat is on the mat” | There
is a creature of the genus and species felis catus lying prone upon
a rectangle of flooring material). Rather, one thinks conditions of
satisfaction have been met, or thinks others think they have, when
in fact they have not. Example: BEL(“I’m a terrible person”) does
not imply one in fact is a terrible person (under some plausible
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consensus definition of what that means), or that others think so.
Initially, negatively-valenced beliefs arise from misinterpretation
of exteroceptive and interoceptive evidence and from informa-
tion processing deficits (Paulus and Stein, 2010; Boden et al.,
2012). Misevaluation of conditions of satisfaction then causes one
to misjudge the evidence supporting the feared outcomes (“cost
biases”) (Nelson et al., 2010a,b).
Normatively, we are inclined to impose certain minimum
requirements on a set of beliefs in order to maximize the likeli-
hood there will be a match between beliefs and conditions of sat-
isfaction. These include conformity, conditioning and coherence
(Howson, 2009).
CONFORMITY
Conformity disregards the substantive propositional content
(“x”) of BEL(“x”) and requires only that one not endorse (“-x”)
simultaneously. Actual human reasoning might not be quite that
simple. Research shows that people deal with inconsistencies not
by attempting to refute one of the premises, but rather by trying
to explain their origins, which has the side effect of revising their
beliefs (Khemlani and Johnson-Laird, 2011).
CONDITIONING
Conditioning means that one should hold BEL(“x”) only for so
long as {EVID1, EVID2,. . . EVIDn} support (x) and that one
must update (x) in light of new, incoming EVID. Such an update
may involve modifications to the belief ’s conditions of satisfac-
tion. Acquiring, maintaining and using new evidence in order
to revise and update beliefs is a crucial human survival strategy
(Patterson and Barbey, 2013). When incorrect or obsolete, con-
ceptual knowledgemust be repaired by integrating and explaining
new material (Friedman and Forbus, 2011).
COHERENCE
Coherence means that only tautological falsehoods qualify for a
probability assignment of p(x = 0) and only tautological truths
qualify for p(x = 1). Thus one should not assign p(BEL) = 0 to
(BEL = “the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180◦”), §1.2, above.
Rather, one should assign it p(BEL) = 1.
Although they seem sensible, these axioms often do not apply
to psychopathological states, because cognitive processing sys-
tems are impaired and emotion processing systems are dysregu-
lated. Persons holding dysfunctional beliefs also may not be able
to reason normatively. For example, they may disbelieve a set
of propositions (e.g., evolution, global warming), which (most)
everybody else believes (Perring, 2010). They may be indiffer-
ent to antecedent beliefs and stored knowledge; misunderstand
inferential relationships; prioritize anomalous perceptual experi-
ences; and lack a coherent theory of mind (Davies and Coltheart,
2000). It also makes sense to think of sentences expressing the
ideations of persons with psychiatric disorders (§1.2, above)
as ultra-opaque, thus even less amenable to substitutability of
identity.
Their ability to evaluate evidence also may be impaired.
Normatively, one relies on evidence to support a belief that what
one thinks will occur, actually does occur. The evidence does not
contradict, and in fact supports, the belief. In problematic cases,
though, one does not have to believe a feared outcome or conse-
quence actually will occur. Rather, all one has to believe is that the
evidence supports the belief that it will, regardless of whether it
happens or not (Joyce, 2011; §1.1, above). In such cases, the evi-
dence supporting the belief is misaligned with reality (Warman
et al., 2007; Möller, 2012). Clearly this is a slippery slope. If peo-
ple can believe whatever they want, then what’s to stop them,
particularly if they have a mental disorder?
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY THEORY
There are two modern epistemic interpretations of probability,
which are logicism and subjectivism (Galavotti, 2011). Logicism
contends that probability is a person-independent, normative
relationship between real-world facts or events. Subjectivism is
the theory that probability is one’s degrees of belief (Hájek, 2011).
Under the logicist interpretation, a tautological statement (such
as A → B; A; ∴ B) is certain regardless of what people may think
about it. Its probability pwithin a sample space is 1 and in prin-
ciple a large number of other beliefs can be incorporated within
 so long as they are complementary (§1.6.3, above). Under the
subjectivist interpretation, different persons can believe what-
ever they want and assign their beliefs different p-values, even
given the same evidence, permitting wide intersubjective belief
variation.
Subjectivism almost certainly is true when considering a per-
son’s individual beliefs (§1.3, above). It breaks down, however,
when considering a set comprising different beliefs, all held by
the same person. This surely is normative. It would be odd for a
person only to have one belief. Most people probably hold tens
of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of beliefs, and
their knowledge base most likely expands over time (Ohlsson,
2011, p. 293). The problem is not about subjectivism. Rather, it
is about probability. Probability assessments do not occur on an
interval scale, making it impossible to combine them or deter-
mine something analogous to their “mean” probability function
using a linear poolingmethodology (Wallsten et al., 1997)6. Beliefs
comprising belief sets are interdependent, not independent. As
a result, they cannot be evaluated using a differential equation
or structural equation modeling approach. A differential equa-
tion approach will not work, because one cannot parameterize
the values of the variables in order to create a belief change trajec-
tory or phase portrait within a vector field. A structural equation
modeling approach will not work, because one needs dimension-
ality reduction. For example, if one holds 13 separate beliefs, the
binominal coefficient is 715. Their interaction effects are 13! (13
factorial), or 6,227,020,800. Beliefs simply cannot be converted
into numbers. They are not variables with values. Consequently,
there must be some other way to fit beliefs into a non-linear
dynamical model.
BELIEFS HAVE SEMANTIC, PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT
The solution is that beliefs have semantic, propositional content.
Semantic content need not be expressed in complete sentences or
6Primarily for this reason, it is not clear that a comprehensive Bayesian
approach to belief formulation and revision (for a summary, see Davies and
Egan, 2013) is viable.
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even phrases. It can be concepts that either are the semantic con-
tent or that combine to form it (Laurence and Margolis, 2012).
Beliefs are just such a conceptual state. Unlike variables popu-
lated by values, they must be elicited using a natural language and
then comprised into sets at various stages of the belief generat-
ing process (t1, t2,. . . tn). One selects beliefs and includes them as
members of belief sets by promoting or prioritizing them ahead
of others, based on one’s credences in the evidence supporting
them, or levels of confidence in their conditions of satisfaction
(§1.5, above; Makinson, 2009; Dietrich and List, 2013). Credences
are situated along a continuum ranging from complete certainty
of falsehood (does not meet perceived conditions of satisfaction)
to complete certainty of truth (meets perceived conditions of
satisfaction), depending on the evidence (Joyce, 2009).
Preference functions
Individual beliefs are organized into sets by preference or rank-
ing functions (γ), which assess the occurrence or persistence of
the belief (Spohn, 2009). In order to assign a preference function,
one must adopt a theory of utility to determine what counts as a
desirable (utility-maximizing) action; establish degrees of belief;
rank preferences; and determine what evidence counts as con-
firming what beliefs (Johnson-Laird, 2010, 2013; Meacham and
Weisberg, 2011). The higher a belief ’s preference function, the
more likely it is to provide a basis for behavior (Segerberg et al.,
2009)7. Following this compilation process, different belief sets
then can be evaluated in order to determine the nature, scope and
extent of belief revision, most likely by a human skilled in use of
the language in which the beliefs are expressed8. It is likely that dif-
ferent beliefs impose contrasting and disparate semantic burdens,
based on factors such as prevalence, complexity, and the number
of inferences involved.
Semantic encoding
An example of a technique that has been devised to elicit beliefs
is the articulated thoughts in simulated situations (ATSS) think-
aloud paradigm, initially developed by Davison et al. (Zanov and
Davison, 2010). Computational semantics attempts to model key
features of natural language processes such as word meaning,
sentence meaning, pragmatic usage and background knowledge
(Stone, 2014). Recent initiatives include WordNet (Princeton
University, 2010); latent semantic analysis (LSA) (University of
Colorado Boulder, 1998); and SNePS (SNePS. Research Group.,
2013). WordNet is a lexical database that groups words into sets
of distinct cognitive concepts. LSA evaluates word similarity by
similarity of context of use. SNePS is a natural language knowl-
edge representation and reasoning system. A SNePS sub-routine
models belief revision to maintain conformity, conditioning and
coherence (§1.6.1, §1.6.2, §1.6.3, above). It too requires both indi-
vidual beliefs and their relationships to be semantically encoded.
One of the research priorities of several of today’s most prominent
internet companies is to develop algorithms for natural language
7Other than noting its important function, it is beyond the scope of this
review to assess γ’s mechanism of action.
8Obviously this may be any type of language capable of performing this
function.
recognition. Apple acquired Siri in April 2010 (Wortham, 2010);
Facebook announced Graph Search in January 2013 (Sengupta,
2013); Google announced Hummingbird in September 2013
(Miller, 2013); Yahoo announced SkyPhrase in December 2013
(Goel, 2013); and in February 2014, Wolfram released software
intended to answer natural language queries with real-world
information as a kind of “computational knowledge-engine”
potentially demonstrating a form of “machine intelligence”
(Lecher, 2014). One of the main challenges of these initiatives will
be to capture the numerous shades and nuances of meanings used
by fluent language speakers–the senses of words, in Fregean terms
(§1.2, above).
Semantic entailment
Closely related are problems of semantic entailment, that is,
when a phrase or sentence commits one to other associated con-
cepts. A classic example: “Socrates lived in Greece” should be
inferred from “Socrates lived in Athens.” Words are organized
into “semantic/associative neighborhoods within a larger net-
work of words and links that bind the network together” (Nelson
et al., 2013, p. 797); Schroeter (2012) characterizes it as a two-
dimensional semantic space comprising rules for assigning values
to words and sentences. Specifying exactly what these neighbor-
hoods and networks are is challenging, because (as with semantic
encoding, §1.8.2, above) it depends on acquiring paraphrases,
lexical semantic relationships, and inferences in contexts such as
question answering, information extraction and summarization–
similar to the usages employed by a natural language speaker
(Dagan et al., 2009).
BELIEFS DO NOT EXIST IN ISOLATION
As semantic entailment illustrates, beliefs are components of
complex domains, knowledge sets and networks (Davidson,
1994/2005). The limits of certitude on the one hand and psy-
chopathology on the other allow for a wide variety of differ-
ent {BEL | EVID} (Huber, 2009). One has an extensive set of
unspecific background beliefs, which are culturally sensitive and
context-dependent. They are “encoded in our linguistic formula-
tion of the problem” (Weisberg, 2011, p. 507). Activities such as
data selection, acquisition and learning require constant revision
to one’s knowledge base. Belief formation is subject to the over-
whelming intervention of human experience, chance events and
real-world constraints (Oaksford and Chater, 2007).
Quine and Ullian (1978) refer to this as a “web of belief”–
“The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most
casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws
of atomic physics or even of puremathematics and logic, is aman-
made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges”
(Quine, 1953/1980, p. 42). Another way to look at beliefs is how
they fit into what Searle (1995) calls the “background”–“all of
those abilities, capacities, dispositions, ways of doing things and
general know-how that enable us to carry out our intentions and
apply our intentional states generally” (Searle, 2010, p. 31); or, the
“foundational, non-representational non-rule-governed, disposi-
tional structure of everyday understanding that underpins both
our perception and our reasoning” (Rhodes and Gipps, 2008,
p. 295).
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DYNAMICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE FORMATION
Another important factor involved in belief semantics is the
dynamics of natural language formation. Any language must have
certain minimal constructs and features. These include gener-
ativity (one can create an indefinite number of new sentences
from its component elements); discreteness (semantic elements,
such as words, retain their identity, even in different syntacti-
cal contexts); compositionality (smaller language units, such as
words, can be combined to form more complex ones, such as
sentences); predictability; and recursion (phrases can be embed-
ded within phrases to create new sentences) (Hauser et al., 2002;
Studdert-Kennedy, 2005; Searle, 2007). NoamChomsky famously
theorized there was a universal human linguistic structure, which
he called “generative grammar” (Chomsky, 1955, 1965). For
Chomsky, syntax was the essential component of language, as
opposed to semantics (meaning and reference) and pragmatics
(how language actually is used) (Chomsky, 1977)9.
LANGUAGE AND MIND
It is beyond the scope of this review to investigate the complex
relationships between language andmind (for a current overview,
see Gleitman and Papafragou, 2012, 2013). Issues include crit-
icism of Chomsky’s views; whether logical variables represent
the propositional contents of mental states and that cognition
consists in manipulating them, a view most closely associated
with Jerry Fodor (1975); criticism of Fodor’s views; the linguis-
tic relativity hypothesis (Swoyer, 2003); whether one can observe
thoughts or emotions without labeling them (Linehan, 1993); or
whether simply changing the way one labels them is effective to
initiate cognitive/affective/behavioral change (Lieberman et al.,
2007; Hayes et al., 2012). Our concern is not just a matter of
choosing new words to describe beliefs, but rather reformulat-
ing beliefs, which then are expressed using words. At a minimum,
we are in accord with Davidson (1975), who holds that belief is
central to thought and that to have a belief requires the ability to
express it using words10.
The substantive propositional content of an individual belief
is interesting and important, particularly for determining just
which dysfunctional beliefs typically align with different types of
psychopathology. We are more interested, though, in the relation-
ship of an individual belief to the other constituents of the belief
set of which the individual belief is a member, and how that set’s
membership changes or is reformulated between t1 and tn. Belief
revision does not involve alteration or replacement of that which
the belief is about, i.e., the “x” in BEL(that “x”). It is not a form of
9The logical underpinnings of natural languages is an involved subject,
beyond the scope of this review; for recent discussions, see Carruthers (2012)
and Scholz (2011). Culbertson and Adger (2014) recently concluded that some
grammatical rules (such as placing adjectives closest to the noun they modify)
are innate.
10Davidson also contends that one must be aware one has a belief in order
to hold it to begin with, because if one didn’t, then one wouldn’t be able to
change it, because one wouldn’t be able to recognize that the underlying belief
was false. This type of metacognitive awareness might be helpful for eliciting
beliefs, §1.8.2, above. However, we concur with Laurence andMargolis (2012)
that such a requirement overstates the case.
reality modification. Rather, the focus of change is belief consid-
ered as a propositional attitude (§1, above). The nature, scope and
extent of belief revision only can be evaluated by inspecting mod-
ifications to the semantics of sets of {BEL | EVID} at k1 and kn.
INTEGRATING BELIEF INTO A NON-LINEAR DYNAMICAL SYSTEM
Given these complex conditions, how can belief revision using
CBT be integrated into a theory of non-linear, dynamical systems?
As set forth at our Introduction, above, belief revision essen-
tially involves two separate pathways: one through cognition, the
other through behavior. CBT straightforwardly uses interventions
directed toward both. The first, cognitive restructuring, requires
belief revision in order to initiate behavioral change. The sec-
ond, exposure/response prevention, requires behavioral change in
order to initiate belief revision. Both cognitive restructuring and
exposure/response prevention are mechanisms of belief revision
from k1 to k2 (k1  k2). Figure 2 illustrates their respective critical
paths for a client presenting with borderline personality disorder,
DSM-5 §301.83.
COGNITIVE RESTRUCTURING
Cognitive restructuring is the therapeutic technology underlying
the “cognitive” component of CBT (Spiegler and Guevremont,
2009). It contends that belief revision is the active ingredient
motivating behavioral change: if belief set k1 at time t1 is mod-
ified to belief set kn at time tn, then more adaptive behavior
will follow (Leahy, 2001, p. 23). Cognitive restructuring erodes
dysfunctional beliefs through several steps: (1) identify them;
(2) marshal disconfirming evidence against them; (3) decon-
struct them by challenging and refuting them; (4) replace them
with alternative, more functional beliefs; and then (5) conduct
behavioral experiments to see how the environment responds
(Huppert, 2009; McMillan and Lee, 2010; Morina et al., 2011).
Examples of cognitive-oriented interventions include decatastro-
phizing, disputing the evidence, detecting logical errors, chain
analysis, situational analysis, etc. (Leahy and Rego, 2012).
Clinical interventions look something like these: If one is
afraid of snakes, that belief can be challenged through a series
of counter-examples. A herpetologist might be concerned with
the snake’s various anatomical features. A veterinarian might
be concerned with its health. A herpetoculturist might be con-
cerned with its taxonomy. Some people have them as pets, or pose
with them for photographs, or perform with them in theatrical
productions. Each of these persons has a different, proactive men-
tal stance toward things that are (or that appear to be) snakes,
none of which are threatening. Or, if a person with lived expe-
rience concedes suicidal ideations or reports parasuicidal target
behavior, then one way to interrupt her might be to evaluate the
evidence and establish the active ingredients of a life worth living:
“We have no reliable information that persons who are dead have
a better quality of life than persons who are alive. If you’re dead,
then therapy won’t work and you won’t be able to get better.”
It follows that in order to recalibrate one’s belief-generating
system, one must modify one’s credences in the evidence sup-
porting the pathological belief. The first step in cognitive restruc-
turing is to elicit BEL(x). Then, for example, BEL(“I’m afraid
of x”) at t1 might get cognitively restructured into something
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic of non-linear dynamical belief revision
processes in CBT. ∗Adapted from Bahr et al., 2008. ¶Adapted from
Linehan, 1993. k1 is one’s knowledge base at time t1; k2, at t2;
this example uses beliefs characteristic for a person presenting with
symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of borderline personality
disorder.
like BEL⊕(“There’ve been times when I’ve encountered x and it
wasn’t so bad”) at t2. Positive belief attributions (BEL⊕) supplant
negative ones (BEL). Following cognitive restructuring, one
then searches for discrepant evidence to confirm BEL⊕ and dis-
confirm BEL, giving one a good reason to reformulate one’s
behavioral repertoire (Garland et al., 2010; Morina et al., 2011;
Lightsey et al., 2012). Like belief, fear simply is another proposi-
tional attitude, i.e., {fear(x) | EVID}. Once one has accumulated
enough relevant evidence, the choice clearly is framed: spend a
significant portion of one’s time entrained to the feared outcome,
vs. the likelihood it actually will occur (i.e., conditions of satis-
faction will be met, §1.5, above). From an assessment standpoint,
this likely would require one to have good metacognitive aware-
ness, that is, the ability to reflect upon, understand and control
their learning (Schraw and Dennison, 1994) in order to be able to
identify and articulate their beliefs. A related concept from attach-
ment theory is that of reflective functioning, that is, the ability to
observe and describe one’s ownmental state (Fonagy et al., 1991).
Cognitive restructuring presents several issues:
1. It is difficult to challenge entrenched beliefs, even when they
result in target behavior. Although maladaptive, to some
extent they relieve immediate personal distress. Over time they
are reinforced and become a conditioned response to the cir-
cumstances triggering them, which consolidate around their
utility and effectiveness (Hartley and Phelps, 2012).
Example: aerophobia (fear of flying). In effect one has
become fear-conditioned: the unconditioned stimulus (flying)
initially provokes anxiety (unconditioned response), then
becomes paired or associated with other typically-innocuous
contexts or situations extrapolated from or analogized to
the original one (such as acrophobia, fear of heights, the
conditioned stimulus) (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2008). The
resulting thought-pathways become ingrained with experi-
ence as they are reinforced by sufficient confirming evidence
that maintains the associated beliefs until they become con-
ditioned, learned responses (Tryon and McKay, 2009). One
keeps doing the same thing over and over again because one
is afraid of the perceived consequences of doing anything else.
2. Cognitive restructuring readily can morph into a form of
escape/avoidance, if misapplied, because it feeds into intel-
lectualization rather than the emotional, felt experience of a
genuinely feared outcome. From a clinical perspective, too
much thinking can become therapy-interfering, because one
might approach the feared outcome as a puzzle to be solved. If
this happens, then cognitive restructuring might backfire and
one’s tolerance of the feared outcome deteriorates even further.
Feelings and thoughts both are in continuous competition for
the same cognitive resources.
3. Because it involves a series of complex mental events, cog-
nitive restructuring may be too complicated for many per-
sons, especially those presenting with delusional features or
severely dysregulated emotions (§4, below). They barely may
be able to tolerate their dysfunctional beliefs, much less gener-
ate new ones. Persons with body dysmorphic disorder (BDD),
for example, have a granular information processing style so
they recall selective details of their appearance, rather than
larger organizational design features (Feusner et al., 2007).
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This makes it difficult for them to generalize from a spe-
cific exposure addressing a particular feared outcome to more
global cognitive change. While one might become inocu-
lated or desensitized to a particular trigger, establishing it
also applies in other contexts requires deducing there is a
more pervasive relationship between them–which is a cog-
nitive process. In effect one must blunt the impulse toward
fractalization.
If one adopts the wrong cognitive hypothesis, then it will be inef-
fective to revise the associated belief set. In order to be successful,
cognitive restructuring must correctly identify the ultimate fear:
“I’ll lose control,” “I’ll be judged,” “I’ll be embarrassed and humil-
iated,” “I’m going to die,” etc. If one is afraid of physiological
symptoms such as those characteristic of panic, then the question
should be, what happens next? For example, if a client presents
with symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of social anxiety disor-
der (SAD), such as vasodilation (blushing), then the consequence
might be that “people think I’m an idiot.” If people think one’s
an idiot, then the next consequence might be “I’ll be rejected and
abandoned.” If one’s rejected and abandoned, then the next con-
sequence might be “I’ll lose my job and my relationships,” etc. If
the terminal fear is not adequately specified, then target behav-
ior actually might increase over baseline, because rather than
contending with dysfunctional beliefs, one just has animated or
enlivened them. The reason why is because one thinks one has
handled the problem, but one really hasn’t (§1.6, above). One
just has deferred dealing with it. As a result, further triggers will
continue to recruit and redeploy cognitive, affective and phys-
iological assets to support it (Smits et al., 2008; Olthuis et al.,
2012).
4. Cognitive restructuring essentially is a process of “out with
the old, in with the new” using interventions such as those
described at §2.1, above (Leahy and Rego, 2012). Because
CBT regards dysfunctional beliefs as distortions or errors in
thinking, such a challenge might be experienced as emotion-
ally invalidating (Leahy, 2001, p. 58; Linehan, 1993, p. 92).
Familiar (and to some extent serviceable) beliefs may be
revealed as unrealistic, mistaken, distorted, or even irrational.
As a result, subsequent behavior might just exchange one
cognitive/affective state (e.g., anxiety) for another (e.g., “I’m
deficient” or “I’m defective”). In this respect, dialectical behav-
ior therapy (DBT) augments CBT case conceptualization.
It emphasizes emotional validation in addition to cognitive
restructuring. It is not enough to focus only on beliefs and
behavior, because emotions (and their associated interoceptive
sensations) also are an integral component of the same equa-
tion. In fact, if anything, in a contest between emotions and
cognitions, emotions most likely will win out, because they are
more fundamental and, in a sense, primordial (LeDoux, 1996;
Damasio, 1999; Afraimovich et al., 2011; Frazzetto, 2013). A
recent study by Moser et al. (2014) concluded that positively
reinterpreting negative emotional experiences (such as those
associated with fearful outcomes) is one of belief revision’s key
mechanisms, with well-defined neurological correlates. The
equation should read: {dysfunctional beliefs} + {emotional
dysregulation} = {target behavior}11.
5. CBT uses phrases such as “downward arrow technique”
(Persons et al., 2006) and “chain analysis” (Lynch et al., 2006)
as metaphors for complex cognitive processes, without consid-
ering their component elements. This leaves beliefs in a kind of
mysterious “black box”–something everyone knows must be
addressed, but without unpacking their underlying logic and
structure. What CBT lacks (and what we offer) is a theory of
belief revision–which beliefs get changed, why those instead of
others, and what the constraints are.
6. Cognitive therapy is a means to behavioral change, not an end
in and of itself. During cognitive restructuring, one develops
hypotheses that exposure/response prevention either will fal-
sify or prove. For example, if a person with SAD undergoes
cognitive therapy and concludes, “Well, I guess it’s not so bad
if I speak up at meetings,” but then never does so, cognitive
restructuring will not have been effective.
EXPOSURE/RESPONSE PREVENTION
CBT’s second critical path is behavioral intervention
based around the concept of progressive desensitization-
exposure/response prevention to a feared outcome, rather than
escape/avoidance of it. It proposes that the main driver for
therapeutic change is behavior, not cognition. It assumes that
it is difficult for cognition alone to motivate new behavior;
that one of the main reasons why persons engage in target
behavior is to attempt to induce their environment to respond;
that when reinforcement contingencies are altered, behavioral
modification follows; and that psychological change occurs as a
result. Instead of being the driving force motivating behavioral
change, cognition brings up the rear. This dichotomy is similar to
that between thought and action, or thinking vs. doing.
Using this approach, the first question always must be “how
did the behavior get to be the way that it is.” Often this can be
explained using classical and operant conditioning paradigms.
Sometimes people enact coping strategies to prevent something
bad from happening; occasionally, it may even be pleasurable. If,
however, actions have not had effects, then it is necessary to sup-
ply them in order to consequate that behavior. The next step is
to unpair or decouple a conditioned stimulus from an uncon-
ditioned one, or to extinguish target behavior that previously
has been reinforced (and the entire cycle giving rise to it), by
establishing prospective environmental contingencies; acquiring
skills; enacting new behavior; and then evaluating evidence as to
how the environment responds (Spiegler andGuevremont, 2009).
At each stage, behavioral markers demonstrate that the feared
outcome did not occur.
Target behavior typically is a form of escape/avoidance. It may
be accommodating and protective in the short term, because it
reduces the threat posed by dysfunctional beliefs (§2.1.1, above;
11While we spend considerable time analyzing pathways between cognition
and behavior (§4), it is beyond the scope of this review to expand our
analysis to include emotions and affect. For speculation on this point, see
(Afraimovich et al., 2011; Huntsinger and Schnall, 2013); and (Rabinovich
et al., 2010a).
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 55 | 9
Kronemyer and Bystritsky Belief revision in CBT
Hofer, 2010). However, it is ineffective over the long term, as
novel and even more threatening stimuli arise in the world and
present for interpretation and action (Roemer et al., 2002; Carter
et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2010). It does not affect one’s pre-existing
vulnerabilities and the environmental affordances that trigger or
activate them. It does not down-regulate dysfunctional beliefs
or dysregulated emotions. Instead, by impeding assimilation of
accurate information, it maintains judgmental biases, emotional
vulnerability and alarm sensitivity–a kind of “contrast avoidance”
(Taylor and Alden, 2010; Newman and Llera, 2011, p. 226).
Adaptive new behavior, on the other hand, is generated
by stepwise exposure followed by systematic desensitization or
response prevention. Initially this is a “fragile behavioral state”
and can be recovered “spontaneously or subsequent to environ-
ment influences, such as context changes or stress” (Herry et al.,
2010, p. 599). As one confronts the feared stimulus, the fear
becomes extinguished through a reverse inhibitory learning pro-
cess, allowing for more flexible control of conditioned response
by forming a consolidated extinction memory. With continued
or reinitiated exposure, post-behavior cognitions consolidate and
become further refined, dampening responsiveness in the brain’s
fear-sensitive network (Hauner et al., 2012; Trouche et al., 2013).
Similar to cognitive restructuring (§2.1.3, above), in order to be
an effective intervention, exposure/response prevention must be
autogenic, i.e., personalized more or less exactly to falsifying or
validating a specific feared outcome–the one that matters the
most.
Example: if one is afraid of heights and things that move
quickly, then an escape/avoidance strategy would be not to engage
with them. An exposure/response prevention strategy, on the
other hand, would be to take opposite action by (say) going on a
series of roller-coaster rides at an amusement park, starting with
those that are small and innocuous but then building up over the
course of a day to those that are taller and faster. At each step one
take’s stock of one’s mental condition, notices that one still is alive
and breathing, thereby habituating or acclimating oneself to more
challenging stimuli, resulting in cognitive change. Example: if one
is afraid of driving on the freeway, then an escape/avoidance strat-
egy would be to take surface streets. What happens, though, if the
surface streets all are blocked and the only way to get to one’s des-
tination is by taking the freeway? The escape/avoidance strategy
no longer works. A more adaptive exposure/response prevention
strategy would be to progressively expose oneself to driving on
the freeway by (say) traveling from one on-ramp to one off-ramp
at a time, then gradually building this up to two, then three, etc.
Example: rather than engaging in a difficult and potentially futile
process of weighing pros and cons in order to motivate herself not
to drink alcohol, a person with substance over-use issues alters her
behavioral regimen not to drive by liquor stores and restructures
her social network to exclude those persons maintaining it.
Behavior modification is powerful. Some theorists contend
that in a contest between beliefs and behavior (i.e., cognitive
restructuring versus exposure/response prevention followed by
belief consolidation), behavior always will win; see e.g., Gipps
(2013) and Longmore and Worrell (2007). Historically, commit-
ted behaviorists denied one has beliefs to begin with; rather,
one only is disposed to respond to stimuli (Pavlov, 1927/2003;
Skinner, 1947; Ryle, 1949/2009). Today, along similar lines, elim-
inative materialists such as Churchland and Churchland (1998)
and Dennett (1992) deny beliefs are anything more than folk-
psychological explanations (this phrase is intended to be mildly
derisive) of complex neurological events (Bickle et al., 2010). The
weakness of this formulation is what originally lead to the cogni-
tive revolution, as exemplified, for example, by Chomsky’s (1959)
critique of Skinner’s (1957/1991) Verbal Behavior. Behavior does
not, however, occur in a vacuum. There must be some threshold
level of belief revision in order to stimulate it, most likely based on
the salience of an initial belief or belief set, its relevance to current
goals, or its resonance with a particular feature of the environ-
ment. In principle this should be similar to the way that intention
redirects attention from the default mode network to some other
neural construct or constructs (Buckner et al., 2008; Rabinovich
et al., 2012a). Attention focuses intentional orientedness, caus-
ing heightened self-monitoring, resulting in greater interoceptive
sensitivity (Simmons et al., 2006; Woody and Nosen, 2009), one
of the main precursors to belief change.
Thereafter, the role of cognition primarily is to consolidate
revised beliefs and build behavioral insight. Beliefs are conjec-
tures or predictions about conditions of satisfaction and the
evidence supporting them. The only way to accumulate evidence
is by enacting behavioral experiments and seeing what happens.
From a clinical standpoint, the client can assume the role of
an anthropologist, investigating the behavior of a strange tribe,
of which she also happens to be a member. If there is insuffi-
cient evidence to support a belief, or the evidence disconfirms
it, then there is no particular reason why it should be retained
as a component element of a belief set. Discrepant evidence cre-
ates “expectation violations” (disconfirms pathogenic beliefs),
modifying behavioral vectors previously directed toward avert-
ing feared outcomes, thereby raising the cognitive accessibility
of alternative and more flexible belief formulations. In many
instances, the cognitive objective is not to eradicate fear, but
rather to tolerate ambiguity. Using a variation of the Rescorla
and Wagner (1972) model, Craske et al. (2012) recently advo-
cated that while it may become semi-perturbed, the pairing or
coupling between the conditioned stimulus and the uncondi-
tioned stimulus never really is eradicated. Instead, it is inhibited
or attenuated. It follows that variability in fear level, or reintro-
ducing elements of the unconditioned stimulus concurrently with
the conditioned stimulus during exposure, is more likely to cre-
ate a durable learning experience. Doing so maximally violates
expectations, eliciting more improvisational and extemporane-
ous behavior, thereby promoting belief revision (Kircanski et al.,
2012). The goal is not so much extinction (from a behavioral
standpoint) as it is acceptance (from a cognitive standpoint)—
which is a completely different skill. As the Viennese novelist
(and, in retrospect, proto-ACT theorist) Robert Musil (1930-43)
declared: “one must live with uncertainty, yet not be caught in
hesitation.”
Cognition also extrapolates or pluralizes revised beliefs to
analogous contexts. When one masters a skill in a certain domain,
that mastery experience carries over to others. Only the target
behavior will be affected without generalization effects. While this
may be acceptable insofar as it goes, especially in refractory cases,
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exposure/response prevention will have limited success unless it
also addresses adjacent beliefs (Arntz, 2002; Bryant et al., 2003).
To continue with the example from §2.1.6, above, if a person
with SAD starts mindlessly speaking up at meetings, that will
not in and of itself change cognition. It simply is a form of
unregulated exposure/response prevention. It may even become
a form of escape/avoidance if she engages in it unthinkingly in
order to avoid cognitive dissonance, a necessary precursor to
extinction. The more that target behavior is effective as a form
of escape/avoidance, the more difficult it will be to create a
counteracting exposure/response prevention, precipitating belief
revision. Reciprocally, some persons who hold severely dysfunc-
tional beliefs or who are considerably emotionally dysregulated
may lack the cognitive capacity to perform generalization opera-
tions (§4, below). In such cases, target behavior must be specified
evenmore precisely, otherwise it will not be extinguished, or some
other undesired behavior will be reinforced instead.
AUTOMATIC NEGATIVE THOUGHTS, INTERMEDIATE BELIEFS, CORE
BELIEFS
How do cognitive restructuring and exposure/response preven-
tion integrate with the epistemology of CBT? Received Beck-
Ellis theory (Ellis, 1994; Beck, 2011) holds that doxastic agents
have a hierarchy of automatic thoughts, intermediate beliefs and
core beliefs. There now are several dozen recognized schools of
CBT, all of which trace their provenance back to Beck and Ellis
(Emmelkamp et al., 2010).
Automatic thoughts
For Beck (2011), automatic thoughts are an undercurrent of
cognitions and self-talk, subject to articulation on query or in
response to an analogous simulation (Zanov and Davison, 2010).
They rarely are conscious in the sense of a state one is aware
of, however they typically are accessible and available to other
cognitive processes (van Gulick, 2004).
Intermediate beliefs
Automatic thoughts are linked to core beliefs by intermediate
beliefs. Beck (2011) assumes the role played by intermediate
beliefs is unproblematic (p. 205), however they can be difficult
to formulate and it is not clear anybody ever has held an interme-
diate belief. In principle they should be rules or assumptions in
the form of conditional if-then statements such as: “If I (engage
in rigid behavioral coping pattern), then (I’ll be insulated from a
core belief I’ll experience as aversive)” or “Unless I (engage in rigid
behavioral coping pattern), then (I’ll be exposed to a core belief
I’ll experience as aversive).” For example, if one unexpectedly is
running late for work because the bus is running late, interme-
diate beliefs might be: “If I’m always on time for meetings, then
I’m not inadequate” (or, “Unless I’m always on time for meetings,
then I’m inadequate”). They should not, however, be idiographic.
Thus, “If I’m on time for meetings, then I’ll do well at work” is
not a proper formulation of an intermediate belief. Rather, it is
more of an expression of a particular coping style, connecting
to an individual instance of behavior, not a pattern of behavior.
Nor should intermediate beliefs be depersonalized. Thus, “People
who frequently are late for meetings typically end up losing their
jobs” also is not a proper formulation of an intermediate belief,
because the outcome does not tie to a more generalizable core
belief.
Core beliefs
A core belief is not an actual thought in an epistemological sense.
E.g., if the automatic thought is “I’m running out of money,” then
the associated core belief might be, “One needs a lot of money in
order to be safe,” even though one never actually thinks that par-
ticular core belief. Uncovering it is cognitive restructuring’s raison
d’être. It is tempting to think of a core belief as an implicit con-
clusion derived from the application of a rule (an intermediate
belief) to a premise (an automatic thought). All three are compo-
nents of an information processing system (Beck, 2011, p. 33) or
a way for people to “organize their experience in a coherent way
in order to function adaptively” (Beck, 2011, p. 35).
Still, it is not clear what comprises a set of core beliefs. Is it
just a single belief, or a set of multiple, interdependent beliefs?
Although they acknowledge the possibility that there are many
of them, all of the Beck-Ellis examples treat beliefs as single-
tons rather than as elements of belief sets. It seems implausible
that individual beliefs, regardless of how entrenched, proximately
cause (or explain) a complex phenomenon such as human behav-
ior. It seems more likely that human behavior is the outcome of
a dynamic, interactive network of beliefs (and that it reciprocally
influences them).
It also is unclear just what causes what. Does a trigger–
a real-world or imaginal event–activate core beliefs or auto-
matic thoughts? Once set in motion, which causes which? Beck
(2011) has little to say about the relationships between auto-
matic thoughts, intermediate beliefs and core beliefs other than
core beliefs “activate” automatic thoughts (p. 32) and “underlie”
(p. 36) both them and intermediate beliefs. Intermediate beliefs
“influence” one’s view of the situation or event (p. 35), which
“trigger” automatic thoughts (p. 38) (Beck apparently views these
different verb formulations as synonymous).
BELIEF REVISION–THREE AND ONLY THREE FUNDAMENTAL
SYNTACTICAL OPERATIONS
While CBT provides useful tools that can be used to induce
or facilitate belief revision such as cognitive restructuring or
exposure/response prevention, the problems with Beck’s (2011)
formulation (§2.3, above) make clear that it comes up short to
explain just how they do so. At best, from a clinical standpoint,
they just “soften” a set of dysfunctional beliefs, or point out why
individual beliefs are implausible (Beck) or illogical (Ellis). We
contend that the process of belief revision in CBT can be better
characterized using AGM12.
12Since their original (1985) paper, AGM theory has evolved and under-
gone significant further developments (Makinson, 2003; Costa and Pedersen,
2011; Gärdenfors, 2011). While there are other theories of belief revision
(Fermé and Hansson, 2011), AGM is the one that has acquired the most
traction in the literature. The concept of k, whether and how BEL repre-
sents or stands for a psychological state, all of the AGM postulates and all
of the operations potentially performable on k have been discussed and chal-
lenged extensively. It is beyond the scope of this review to analyze these various
permutations.
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According to AGM, a person’s knowledge base k comprises a
number of individual beliefs, BEL1, BEL2,. . . BEL n, which com-
bine together to form belief sets. AGM provides a set of ecological
rules for how beliefs dynamically evolve by examining the inter-
action effect of k1’s and k2’s respective belief sets at equilibrium
points t1 and t2 during the process of belief revision. The prob-
lem AGM is trying to solve is to minimize the set of BELnew ∈ k2
and the set of BELold /∈ k1 simultaneously, so as to maximally
preserve both k1’s and k2’s inductive cores. Unlike k1, k2 is less
subjectively distressing and leads to more adaptive or normative
behavior.
This is interesting and important because it defines the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for belief revision–what has to
happen and that is all that has to happen. It therefore speci-
fies the minimum requirements necessary for successful cognitive
restructuring or belief modification following exposure/response
prevention. From a clinical standpoint, maybe this is all one can
expect, particularly with difficult cases. It can accommodate a
diverse belief set, limited only by one’s strategies to interpret
beliefs, semantically encode them by assigning them substantive
propositional content (that “x”) and then identify the result-
ing doxastic commitments, which gives it explanatory power.
It deemphasizes the distinction between automatic thoughts,
intermediate beliefs and core beliefs. All beliefs are targets for
revision at any equilibrium point. This better explains the sub-
jective phenomenological experience of belief revision. It also
recognizes there are different related beliefs at t1, t2, etc. Some
motivate behavioral change, e.g., k1 = (“If I enact behavioral
experiment y then z will happen”). Others reinforce it, e.g., k2
following skills acquisition or exposure/response prevention =
(“This is how the environment responded”). It is a dynamical
system because it changes and evolves in real time. It is non-
linear because the “x” of BEL(x) is idiographic, idiosyncratic and
unpredictable.
During belief revision, elements of belief sets are mod-
ified or replaced using three (and only three) fundamen-
tal syntactical operations, which are expansion (EXP); revi-
sion (REV); and contraction (CON). Particular beliefs are
the semantics this architecture supports (Fermé and Hansson,
2011).
EXPANSION (EXP)
EXP is like adding a new belief without deleting any old ones.
EXP (expressed as k1 + BELx) occurs when one accepts, acknowl-
edges or incorporates a BELnew into k1. k2 = (k1 + BELnew):
BELnew is added to k1; no ∃(BEL x ∈ k1) is deleted or removed
from k1; and on conclusion of belief revision, {(BEL1 . . . BELn) ∪
BELnew} ⊆ k2, with the caveat it also is the smallest possible set
of (k2 ∪ BELnew). Although it might be, BELnew does not neces-
sarily have to be consistent with k1. Since AGM does not restrict
the substantive propositional content “x” of BELnew (§1.3, above),
it can have either ⊕ or  valence. If it has ⊕ valence (BELx⊕),
then it contributes to cognitive restructuring at t2. If it has 
valence (BELx), then either it does not contribute to cognitive
restructuring, or may even reinforce k1.
For this reason, EXP might be confusing for an AGM agent.
BELold remain as elements of her belief set, even as they are
joined by BELnew, which can either be BEL⊕, BEL or ambigu-
ous. To continue with our previous example, the trigger is run-
ning late for a meeting at work because one’s bus is late. Under
such circumstances, one’s beliefs might be: BEL1 (“My boss is
going to get angry”), BEL2 (“My colleagues will disrespect me”)
and BEL3 (“My opinion doesn’t count”). One then acquires a
new belief BEL4 (“I need this paycheck to support myself”).
BEL4 is not inconsistent with {BEL1, BEL2, BEL3}. For these
reasons, we hypothesize that it is unlikely EXP alone will result in
successful cognitive restructuring or belief consolidation follow-
ing exposure/response prevention. Figure 3 depicts this outcome.
REVISION (REV)
REV is like adding a new belief and deleting old, inconsistent
ones. As with EXP, REV (expressed as k∗1 BELx) occurs when
one accepts a BELnew or admits it to one’s k1 knowledge base.
k2 = (k1 + BELnew): BELnew is added to k1; on conclusion,
{(BEL1 . . . BELn) ∪ BELnew} ⊆ k2. The main difference between
REV and EXP is that with REV, a BELold must be deleted from k1
so that k2 is consistent with k1.
Pragmatic Closure
k is “logically closed” if it represents all of one’s beliefs, even
though they may be difficult or impossible to specify. Every BEL
FIGURE 3 | EXP.
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logically derivable from k already ∈ k, i.e., k includes not only
BEL but also all BEL consequences. Stand-alone beliefs sometimes
are referred to as “basic beliefs” and consequences as “derived
beliefs”–those beliefs one is epistemically committed to hold, even
though one might not actively do so (Gabbay et al., 2010). Since
k1 is logically closed in this sense, only one anomalous BEL(x) is
sufficient to create inconsistency; an inconsistent k(x) sometimes
is notated as k(x)⊥. In this respect, REV incorporates the concept
of conformity (§1.6.1, above)13.
Frame of discernment
To some extent the problem of logical closure is solved by the
concept of “frame of discernment.” The domain of all possible
beliefs must be truncated in order to engage in practical infer-
ence and reason from belief to action. One’s frame of discernment
is the set of all of the beliefs comprising k that are useful to
answer, in a practical context, the question of what one believes.
It is notated  where (BEL ∈  ∈ k); we might say one’s 
is “pragmatically closed” in order for one to be able to func-
tion effectively in the world. Example: when one adopts the set
1 = {red, white, yellow} as the frame for the question “What
color rose is Bill wearing today?” one formalizes the variable x
with those possible values. The frame 2 = {white, blue} might
answer the question “What color shirt is Bill wearing today?”
The frame for the conjoined question “What color rose and what
color shirt is Bill wearing today?” is 1 × 2 = {(red, white),
(red, blue), (white, white), (white, blue), (yellow, white), (yel-
low, blue)} (Liu et al., 1991). Frame of discernment narrows
13There are several other possible operations one can perform using REV:
“partial meet revision” and “transitively relational partial meet revision.” We
do not cover these, here. Logical closure may be unrealistic in a real-world
environment, because one might not recognize derived beliefs, even if they
are specified. One draws on numerous other beliefs, facts assumptions and
knowledge about the world in order to function effectively within it. It is
unlikely one ever is in command of all possibly relevant evidence pertaining to
a belief or beliefs. It most likely would be impossible to specify fully all of the
beliefs comprising one’s knowledge base, a project that in effect would require
axiomatizing all human knowledge (Dreyfus, 1992; Shanahan, 2009).
down a potentially unwieldy set of beliefs into something more
pragmatically serviceable14.
To continue with our earlier example, let’s say that at k2 one
has acquired BELnew⊕ (“The last time I was late for work, my boss
was understanding”). Because it is BEL⊕, it is inconsistent with
{BEL1, BEL2, BEL3}. The objective of cognitive restructuring
or belief consolidation following exposure/response prevention is
for k1 to be inconsistent with k2. It follows that BELold should be
BEL and BELnew should be BEL⊕, otherwise, there would not
be any therapeutic change. Cognitive restructuring is teleological
in that it is undertaken with a specific objective in mind, which is
belief change and resulting behavior modification. For these rea-
sons, we hypothesize that REV is the paradigm case of successful
cognitive restructuring (see Figure 4).
CONTRACTION (CON)
CON is like deleting an old belief without adding any new ones.
CON (expressed as k1 ÷ BELx) is when one rejects a BELold
or deletes it from her knowledge base. k2 = (k1 − BELold):
k2supersedes k1; k2 ⊆ (k1 | k2  BELold); but from which
no (BELx ∈ k1) has been unnecessarily deleted. Because a BEL
has been deleted from one’s k1 belief set, CON is a process of
14A related concept is partition dependence, which is the psychological
pattern of how one divides up a set of possible outcomes into particular
events. Doing so influences the perceived likelihood those events will occur.
Combining events into a common partition lowers their perceived probability.
Conversely, unpacking events into separate partitions increases their perceived
probability (Sonnemann et al., 2013). For example, apocryphally, Eskimos
have numerous words for “snow,” because that phenomenon allegedly is far
more prevalent where they live than elsewhere (Martin, 1986). They need a
vocabulary with greater subtlety and nuance to describe its various aspects.
This in turn increases the probability an event will be interpreted as snow-
like, because a set of phenomena (e.g. cold wet stuff falling from the sky) with
its associated beliefs (e.g. if you stay out in it too long, you will freeze) has
been parsed out into separate partitions. Rabinovich et al. (2014, p. 1) recently
characterized this as “chunking”–a dynamical strategy agents use to “perform
information processing of long sequences by dividing them in shorter infor-
mation items” thereby making “more efficient use of short-term memory by
breaking up long strings of information.”
FIGURE 4 | REV.
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“epistemic entrenchment.” In rejecting BELold, one also may have
to disavow other BELx that imply or are implied by it. Which
beliefs should be deleted? From the standpoint of CBT:
1. One should start with those beliefs that violate the require-
ments of conformity, conditioning and coherence (§1.6.1,
§1.6.2, §1.6.3, above). Because of coherence, BELx /∈ kn triv-
ially is non-entrenched and tautologies are fully entrenched.
2. Next, since an AGM agent strives for minimal change and
maximum information value, she should relinquish those
beliefs with the least-explanatory power and supporting evi-
dence, because they are less entrenched. The more entrenched
beliefs dominate (“≤”) the lesser entrenched beliefs when
{(BEL1 → BEL2) → (BEL1 ≤ BEL2)} so that k2 comprises
the “inclusion maximal” set (BEL1, BEL2,. . . BELn) | (k1 
BELold) and there is minimal information loss. AGM refers to
the beliefs that stay as “remainders.” The remainders compris-
ing k2 are the maximally-large set of BEL following deletion
of BELold that do not imply any BELold, or their derivatives,
remaining in k1.
3. The exact mix of BELx⊕ and BELx selected by CON is deter-
mined by the preference function γ (§1.8.1, above), which
specifies the minimum set of (BELx ∈ k1) that ought to be
retained in k2. γ should select k(x) in order of plausibility;
(k2γk1) represents k2 as more likely than k1, given BELnew. In
other words, γ should select those BELx most likely to result
in a more functional (less dysfunctional) k2. It follows that
the most preferred candidates γ should select to delete from
k1 (after steps 3.3.1 and 3.3.2) are BEL, such as automatic
negative thoughts and their corollary intermediate beliefs and
core beliefs, in order to maximize CON’s effectiveness. The
remainders then will be BEL⊕.
4. If γ selects a maximally-consistent set of k1 that  BELold)
to become k2, then CON is a “partial meet contraction.” If k2
ends up being populated with only one BELx (unlikely), then
CON is a “maxichoice contraction.” If CON selects all of the
BEL comprising k1 (thus k2 ends up being populated with all
of the them), then CON is a “full meet contraction15.”
We hypothesize that CON is the most problematic maneu-
ver for an AGM agent, because its contribution to cognitive
restructuring depends on whether it operates on a BEL⊕ or
a BEL. If the BEL that are being deleted are BEL, then the
remainders will be BEL⊕. This corresponds with the intuitive
requirement that successful cognitive restructuring should
eliminate dysfunctional BEL, while leaving BEL⊕ alone. On
the other hand, it also illustrates a way in which cognitive
restructuring might backfire, for example, if one is so com-
mitted to a BEL that a BEL⊕ is deleted as a consequence. If
the belief that is being deleted is a BEL⊕, then the remainders
all may end up being BEL, because they are well-entrenched.
An example might be recovery following extinction using a
classical conditioning model, which occurs when k1 ⊆ {(k1 ÷
BELnew) + BELold}. This means that if k1 was EXP by BELold,
15There are several other possible operations one can perform using CON,
including “transitively relational partial meet contraction.” We do not cover
these, here.
but one somehow readopted or reincorporated BELold into her
k1 belief set, then the effect of cognitive restructuring would be
reversed. Or, the BEL set ∈ k2 could be an ambiguous mixture
of both BEL and BEL
⊕
, in which case cognitive restructuring
would only be partially successful. Building on our previous
examples, Figure 5 illustrates an instance of successful belief
revision using CON.
INTEGRATING AGM INTO A THEORY OF NON-LINEAR
DYNAMICAL BELIEF REVISION
We conceptualize belief revision using AGM as an emergent
property of a complex, self-organizing system involving huge
numbers of neurons broadly distributed throughout different
brain regions, including the prefrontal cortex (PFC), Broca’s
area and Wernicke’s area (Cogan et al., 2014). There now has
been considerable research imaging regions of the brain acti-
vated by BEL(x), starting approximately with Greene et al. (2001),
continuing through Harris et al. (2008) and d’Acremont et al.
(2013). Other studies examine brain regions activated by seman-
tic processing–the words in which beliefs are expressed. Huth
et al. (2012) used WordNet (§1.8.2, above) to identify 1705
object and action categories from several hours of nature movies.
When they projected them to research participants undergoing
fMRI, they were able to map semantic selectivity into smooth
gradients covering much of the cortex. Crangle et al. (2013)
presented their research participants with 48 spoken-word and
visual depictions of sentences about the geography of Europe,
half of which were true and half of which were false. They used
WordNet and LSA (§1.8.2, above) to extract and classify their
propositional content–the x in BEL(x). The resulting seman-
tic processing was associated with characteristic features of EEG
recordings. Costanzo et al. (2013) presented research participants
undergoing fMRI with 140 line drawings or pictures of objects
(visual stimuli) together with corresponding nouns spoken aloud
(auditory stimuli). They found that both converged and were
processed in the same regions of the brain during superordinate
semantic categorization.
Semantic memory long has been recognized as a fundamen-
tal component of human cognition (McRae and Jones, 2013). It
is “general knowledge about the world, including concepts, facts
and beliefs” and is acquired through experience, thereby “ground-
ing knowledge in distributed representations across brain regions
that are involved in perceiving or acting” (Yee et al., 2014, p. 353).
Semantic network structure plays a key role in the formulation
of ideas and the ways in which they are combined and con-
ceptually associated (Goñi et al., 2011; Marupaka et al., 2012).
It accommodates both abstract concepts and concrete ones, the
former associated with the medial PFC and the superior tem-
poral sulcus, the latter associated with the bilateral intraparietal
sulcus (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013). It represents cognitive
information either as specific autobiographical episodes or more
general semantic knowledge, each with different subjective expe-
riences (Heisz et al., 2014). Rabinovich et al. (2012b, p. 81)
characterize it as a “space of interconnected information items,”
where “each item [is a separate] dynamical element” and “the
dynamics of thinking (or consciousness) is a flow in a semantic
space.”
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FIGURE 5 | CON.
This body of work supports a conclusion that {BEL | EVID}
is not a specific topological location or ontogenetic landscape
within the brain. Rather, it is a type of neural activity or pattern
of activation that occurs within a comprehensive neural system.
When one believes something, one enters into a series of hybrid
doxastic/semantic states, which can be functionally represented as
a non-linear, dynamical process–a belief revision network occur-
ring in a global workspace–such as that depicted at Figure 6
(while Figure 6 depicts a two-dimensional surface, it should be
understood as a multi-dimensional space; Figure 7 depicts an
alternative perspective).
It also requires a reconceptualization of the relationship
between beliefs and semantics. Unlike an fMRI or EEG record-
ing depicting brain activity, a belief set cannot be described
as a geometrical object or in statistical terms. Rather, it is
an encoded set of semantic propositions, embodying emergent
semantic properties in its very organization (Juarrero, 1999). A
belief set creates an internal symbolic mental representation based
on one’s assessment of its conditions of satisfaction (§1.5, above);
one can imagine the conditions of satisfaction being enacted or
realized16 . It interacts with other brain regions responsible for
16Mental images are controversial (for a summary of recent work, see Doumas
and Hummel, 2012; Markman, 2012; Reisberg, 2014; and Shea, 2013). We are
not committed to a theory that one creates actual, static mental representa-
tions in the brain. They are not pictures, rather, “depictive representations
interpreted by cognitive processes at play in other systems” (Borst, 2014, p.
84). They have “several levels of complexity, from sparse, atomic concepts
to complex, knowledge intensive ones” (Rips et al., 2012, p. 177). An agent’s
perception, cognition, emotion, language and behavior. They are
embedded within a manifold or phase plane together with phys-
iological assets such as blood flow and oxygen. The phase plane
is in a constant state of flux, flexibly changing in response to
environmental constraints and internal demands (Kelso, 1999).
Belief revision is a dynamic pattern of activity occurring within
the phase plane.
Some beliefs initially are stored in long-term memory. These
most likely are enduring, persistent beliefs about self, others,
world and future; background or network beliefs of the sort
described at §1.9, above; and core beliefs of the sort described
at §2.3.3, above. They are recalled into short-term memory
in response to decision points, environmental affordances
and outcomes, and other multiple attractors. The network’s
attractors constitute a “self-organized space with emergent
properties that can only be characterized as semantic” because
they “embody [word] meaning[s] or sense[s] in the organization
behavior must be flexible in order to respond to her circumstances, and men-
tal representations play an important role in enabling her to do so (Egan,
2012, p. 250). Perception, for example, may be more of a process whereby
a perceiver skillfully interacts with her environment. The real world presents
way too much information for the perceiver to encapsulate it in an isomor-
phic mental image. Rather it is like a gigantic external memory, supplying a
series of cues, which the perceiver can access as necessary (Noë, 2004). We do
not, of course, contend that one literally perceives the words comprising the
semantic formulation of one’s belief set (in a manner similar to the way the
Arnold Schwarzenegger character in the movie Terminator III movie was able
to scroll through different belief-action options before selecting a particular
alternative).
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 55 | 15
Kronemyer and Bystritsky Belief revision in CBT
FIGURE 6 | Hypothesized pathways for belief revision–conceptualization 1. Adapted from (Rabinovich et al., 2010a). Used with permission.
FIGURE 7 | Hypothesized pathways for belief revision–conceptualization 2. Adapted from (Rabinovich et al., 2010b). Used with permission.
of the relationships that constitute the higher-dimensional space”
(Juarrero, 1999, p. 167). Initially, the phase plane represents
all possible states of the belief-generating and belief-revision
systems. It has a large number of degrees of freedom. It is unstable
in that small changes to initial conditions–both perceived and
imaginal–have the potential to become radically amplified,
resulting in any number of different multi-stable belief sets.
While the output belief set at kn depends to some extent on
the input belief set at k1, kn is asymmetrical and cannot be
reliably predicted by k1. Arguably, it exhibits chaotic dynamics
because it would be difficult to specify the individual beliefs
comprising the belief set as it evolves into novel and surprising
states that are unexpectedly both deterministic and stochastic
(non-deterministic) (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989).
The belief revision system is transient. At t1, all possible
belief trajectories (starting with the system’s initial conditions)
intersect the phase plane in a structure similar to a Poincaré
surface. As it evolves forward in time, it is bombarded with
evidence–information derived from its interactions with the envi-
ronment and subsequent interpretations. It becomes destabilized
and undergoes non-equilibrium, dissipative phase transition.
Individual beliefs transverse each attractor’s basin of attraction
and converge into specific belief sets, which consolidate at sad-
dle equilibrium points {t1, t2 . . . tn}. They can be conceptualized
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as a form of Mandelbrot fractal. Broader attractor basins cap-
ture or entrain a wider range of beliefs, depending on their
strength. Because of the system’s chaotic dynamics and each
point’s turbulent behavior, they resemble strange attractors.
Convergence results in heteroclinic binding (Rabinovich et al.,
2010b) of different evidentiary data to individual beliefs, which
recruit resources and attempt to gain priority using the pref-
erence function γ as described at §1.8.1, above. The system
bifurcates as new beliefs are formulated based on {BEL | EVID}
(§1.1, above), revised conditions of satisfaction (§1.5, above),
new evidence/information received as a result of interactions
with the environment (§2.2, above), and associated evaluative
processes.
Belief revision occurs as belief sets sequentially progress or
are deflected from one metastable state to another, forming
a heteroclinic channel. The separatices are ridges defining its
boundaries. They constrain the flow of resources available to
each belief set by modifying the phase plane or the possible tra-
jectories of movements within it. As one belief set begins to
dominate, it acquires and sustain coherence, crowding out the
semantic space potentially accessible to other beliefs. At some
point it reaches critical mass and overcomes an inertial thresh-
old, compelling its migration from t1 to tn. During this process,
the k1belief set competes with the k2 belief set (then k2 with k3,
etc.) to alter its composition using CON, EXP, or REV, either in
response to cognitive restructuring or exposure/response preven-
tion with associated environmental feedback, followed by belief
revision.
Since the individual beliefs comprising each belief set dis-
place each other (using CON, EXP, or REV), this is a zero-sum,
inhibitory process. The sequence of equilibrium points in the het-
eroclinic channel form a heteroclinic belief revision network. This
process typically remains non-conscious until at tn, when ele-
ments of the belief set acquire salience or otherwise are extracted
using typical CBT clinical techniques and protocols17. The com-
bination of non-linearity and non-equilibrium, context-sensitive
constraints initially permits multiple solutions, which have the
potential to emerge from and be expressed within a diversified
assortment of behaviors (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989). Numerous
beliefs compete in a kind of winnerless competition (Rabinovich
et al., 2010a). As it stabilizes, though, the belief revision network
appropriates a single behavioral output channel. The behavior
semantically satisfies the intentions motivating it (the conditions
of satisfaction of the associated belief sets, §1.5, above). Upon
its conclusion at tn, the reformulated beliefs comprising the kn
belief set are inserted (or reinserted) back into long-term mem-
ory. The behavioral stream transfers to an adjacent nonlinear
dynamical system for action. Since emotion regulation also plays
17In this we are in accord with Dehaene (2014, p. 8) and Searle (1992, p. 152)
to the effect that “The notion of an unconscious mental state implies accessi-
bility to consciousness. We have no notion of the unconscious except as that
which is potentially conscious.” Metaphorically, beliefs are like objects within
a multi-dimensional hologram; at any given time we are able to observe only
a small portion of them within a potentially vast space-time continuum. Our
characterization of the belief-generation and belief-modification process does
not implicate any particular theory of action or agency, other than the basic
principle that behavior is the action-expression of belief.
an important role in belief revision (Boden and Gross, 2013),
associated emotions also are reregulated (§2.1.4, above)18.
Cognition and behavior comprise a single autocatalytic unit
and it is difficult to assess their respective influences at any tn.
Neurocognitive methods do not yet have sufficient precision to
discriminate between the two (Morrison and Knowlton, 2012).
There are no studies persuasively isolating the cognitive compo-
nent from the behavioral one. Both require selective deployment
of attentional, cognitive and affective resources. Unless belief
revision was assessed immediately following cognitive interven-
tion, before enactment of any behavior, it would not be possible
to isolate the floor effect of cognitive change and control for
reinforcement effects, because cognitive change already would
be in the process being incrementally reinforced (for an early
and unpersuasive attempt to do so based on the concept of
“self-focused attention,” see Wells, 2006). Any kind of change
arguably results in a form of behavior. A recent study on the
efficacy of mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (Kuyken et al.,
2010)–seemingly, the paradigm case of a cognitive intervention–
correctly noted that “these interactive mediation effects indicate
that treatment changes the nature of the relationship between
cognitive reactivity and outcome” (p. 1110).
What we can say is that together, they comprise a heteroge-
neous, self-organized, complex adaptive system (Juarrero, 1999)
(in this sense, realizing Beck’s concept of cognition as an infor-
mation processing system, §2.3.3, above). Both are temporally
and contextually embedded, exchanging information and energy
with each other depending on the task at hand, the level of one’s
skills or expertise to accomplish it, and feedback from the envi-
ronment. Structure and patterns emerge from repeated cycling
involving the cooperation of many individual parts (Thelen and
Smith, 2000). Although the system initially is out of equilib-
rium, with high entropy, it self-organizes by assuming a structure
allowing it to operate more efficiently (Guastello and Liebovitch,
2009). Repeated behavioral stimulation and learning history
facilitate signal transmission between neurons. Neural plastic-
ity promotes Hebbian-type long-term potentiation, which in
turn cascades into further hybrid cognitive-behavioral activa-
tion and reinforcement, strengthening attractors and facilitating
the development of more predictable belief trajectories within
the semantic phase plane. “Through repeated activation of a
pattern the connections between units that are activated simul-
taneously become stronger and the whole pattern becomes an
attractor.” Thus, even if only partially activated, “the network
can complete the pattern by a process of iterative spreading
activation” so “the previously learned pattern is recovered in
a number of updating cycles in which the activation level of
each unit is adjusted according to the activation levels of the
other units and the strength of the connections between the
units” (Pecher, 2013, p. 359). As a result, conditions of satisfac-
tion (§1.5, above) are revised, together with their corresponding
internal symbolic mental representations (§1.1, above). These
brain-environmental interactions comprise a negative feedback
18Though we disagree with Boden and Gross’ naive model of how this works
(pp. 591-2), which appears to be the result of reading too much literature on
acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT).
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loop if they increase the incidence of target behavior; a positive
one, if it decreases.
From a clinical standpoint, many cognitive interventions
(such as mindfulness) are inherently mental and remain thor-
oughly solipsistic even as they reinforce and are reinforced by
new behavior. Many principles of acceptance and commitment
therapy (ACT) are cognitively front-loaded, for example, using
metaphor as a means of identifying and developing a valued
direction and defusing from one’s private mental experiences
(Hayes et al., 2012). Other examples are motivational interview-
ing for substance abuse (Miller and Rollnick, 2012); cognitive
behavioral analysis system of psychotherapy (CBASP) for depres-
sion (McCullough, 2000); and cognitive processing therapy for
PTSD (Resick et al., 2002). Behavioral factors, on the other hand,
more clearly dominate interventions such as behavioral activa-
tion for depression; exposure/response prevention treatment for
obsessive-compulsive disorder or attention deficit disorder; and
prolonged exposure therapy for PTSD (Foa et al., 2007). With its
dual emphases on learning (cognitive) then applying (behavioral)
skills, DBT for borderline personality disorder (§2.1.4, above;
Linehan, 1993) lies somewhere in the middle.
In some instances behavioral therapy is a more plausible inter-
vention than cognitive therapy, and vice versa. Unquestionably
it is possible to train up organisms with little cognitive process-
ing capacity to demonstrate learned behavior. A 700-kg alligator,
for example, has a brain that would fit comfortably inside of
a teaspoon (Coulson and Herbert, 1981), yet still is capable of
learning in the sense of (Squire and Kandel, 1998)19. In princi-
ple, it would be amenable to behavioral therapy. At some point,
though, higher-order propositions must be expressed using nat-
ural language or a natural language equivalent20. Without it,
propositions would neither be true nor false; the concept of truth
builds upon veridical experience. Nor would beliefs have condi-
tions of satisfaction (§1.5, above), nor would psychopathological
beliefs have none (§1.6, above). Unlike behavior therapy, cogni-
tive therapy depends on semantics. For this reason, as per §2.1.3,
above, it is unclear whether persons with thought disorders can
benefit from it (compare Grant et al., 2012 with Aggarwal and
Basu, 2013; for a current overview, see Bachman and Cannon,
2012; and Jauhar et al., 2014). While of course outcomes lie on
a continuum, arguably, it would be ineffective in principle for
those toward the far end of the spectrum. If a person remains
impervious to environmental feedback–she is unable to develop
adaptive cognitions and activate belief revision–we are inclined to
say that something is impeding the assimilation of new evidence,
or that her information processing systems require recalibration.
Functionally, she may be in a concrete operational stage, or oth-
erwise incapable of abstract thought or metacognition. Having
19This is the double entendre behind the title of B.F. Skinner’s famous paper
“Superstition in the Pigeon” (1947). Superstition is a form of cognition,
whereas pigeons only are capable of learned behavior.
20There is no bright-line test for this, either. The meaning of simple propo-
sitions can be enacted using language-like behavior, such as Quine’s famous
example of a speaker using ostension to point to a rabbit, while uttering the
word “gavagi” to designate a rabbit-like stage or rabbit-like behavior (Quine,
1964).
a theory of mind–being able to think about thoughts–may be a
necessary component of psychological change (Saxe and Young,
2014). One solution from an operant conditioning perspective
might be to increase positive reinforcement (R⊕) or to titrate
down punishment using negative reinforcement (R) in order to
upregulate the desired behavior, with a view toward mobilizing
additional cognitive resources.
Most likely cognition and behavior shuttle back and forth
quickly depending on the client’s perceptions, emotions, lan-
guage capability, attentional focus, the context in which behav-
ior occurs, the nature of the transaction the client is having
with her/his environment, experience/learning history, genet-
ics, neurochemistry, interoceptive sensitivity, memory capacity,
heuristics, intuition, vulnerabilities, intentions, skills, values, and
a variety of other factors. Their different trajectories oscillate
(Schultz and Heimberg, 2008) in what Rabinovich et al. (2010b)
would characterize as a heteroclinic channel between metastable
states. Because the brain is a complex system with a variety
of different inputs and outputs, neither cognition nor behavior
can be controlled in isolation (Ruths and Ruths, 2014). From
a clinical standpoint, target behavior should progressively and
dynamically reduce. As depicted at Figures 8, 9, their relation-
ship is transactional. The exact mix of each depends not only
on the type of therapy but also stages in the therapeutic pro-
cess. For example, the manic phase of bipolar disorder (DSM-5
§296.xx) might be more amenable to cognitive therapy, whereas
the depressive phase might be more amenable to behavioral ther-
apy (Leahy, 2005). Daugherty et al. (2009) characterized this as a
Liénard oscillator with autonomous forcing. From the standpoint
FIGURE 8 | Transactional relationships between beliefs and
behavior–conceptualization 1.
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FIGURE 9 | Transactional relationships between beliefs and behavior–conceptualization 2.
of belief revision semantics, the theme of the substantive propo-
sitional content (“x”) remains the same, even as the propositional
attitude toward it changes, e.g., if the domain is “affection,”
then manic = “adorable” whereas depressed = “unlovable.”
Conceptually, behavioral reformulation and cognitive reconstruc-
tion serially propel it in a dynamic progression from t1 through
tn as different inhibitory and stimulating paradigms take effect.
At some point in this process–an extremely interesting one from
the standpoint of cognitive science–their trajectories intersect and
one transitions into the other. Both are active ingredients of
therapeutic change.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate goal of cognitive restructuring or belief consoli-
dation following exposure/response prevention should be thor-
ough overhaul of a meaningful subset of one’s entire belief
system. Simply inducing doubt is not sufficient. An exam-
ple of such a paradigm shift might be a prisoner on death
row who is exonerated by new DNA evidence, resulting in
radical reformation of her knowledge base, or Dostoyevsky’s
experience in front of a mock firing squad (Bloom, 2005).
This is every bit as profound and disruptive as the transi-
tion from Ptolemaic astronomy to Copernican astronomy, or
from Newtonian physics to Einstein physics, or through the so-
called three waves of cognitive behavioral therapy (Hayes, 2004).
Thomas Kuhn (1962/2012) labeled these “scientific revolutions”–
on an individual level, they might be labeled “personal
revolutions.”
In addition to making a case for AGM, one of our main
objectives in this review has been to illustrate a point of intersec-
tion between cognitive science and clinical psychology, two fields
which long have enjoyed an uneasy rapprochement (Macleod,
2010). “The study of psychopathology has. . . become an impor-
tant facet of the cognitive sciences, and the cognitive sciences
have, in turn, exerted an important influence on many regions
of psychiatry” (Cratsley and Samuels, 2013, p. 413). One of the
characteristics of many cognitive science theories is that while
each step of the argument makes sense, when viewed as a com-
plete chain of inferential reasoning, the transition from premises
to conclusion may be implausible, in a C.P. Snow (1959/2012)-
type sense. Like a salmon swimming upstream, one ends up in
a very small pond. Clinical psychology, in turn, depends oper-
ationally on protocols that first were devised over a quarter of
a century ago. The prospects for détente are not as far-fetched
as they initially might seem. For example, on April 1, 2014, the
Max Planck Society announced a C5 million investment in a new
center for computational psychiatry to be based in London and
Berlin, with a view toward uncovering relationships between cog-
nition and psychopathology of the sort we hypothesize (Siddique,
2014).
We submit that the best way to think of our initiative is that it
is an exercise in translational research. It applies a form of non-
linear analysis to the study of complex systems in cognitive science
and behavioral analysis. Even though it may not exactly mirror
actual, common sense psychological activity, logical reasoning
should “clarify, sharpen, systematize the purely semantic-level
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 55 | 19
Kronemyer and Bystritsky Belief revision in CBT
characterization of the demands on any such implementation,
biological or not” (Dennett, 1984/2006, p. 449); to “provide an
account of our cognitive architecture–which specifies the basic
operations, component parts, and organization of the mind”
(Samuels, 2012). It also demonstrates how recent work in exper-
imental cognitive science can be combined with clinical psychol-
ogy to inform the process of psychological change.
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